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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Indigenous people in Bolivia have historically been excluded
from the social and political life of their country, where
socioeconomic differences are highly correlated with ethnic
identities. However, after a serious political crisis, in 2005
an indigenous leader was elected President in an
unprecedented election, and the country has since faced
aggressive social and political transformations. Using
survey data that ranges from 1998 to 2010, this paper shows
some relevant changes in the perceptions and attitudes of
indigenous people towards the democratic regime, its
political institutions, and other citizens. The trends shown
suggest that the average relationship of indigenous citizens
with the state and its institutions has improved both in
relative and in absolute terms. However, levels of political
tolerance among indigenous Bolivians do not seem to have
increased at the same rate as those of non-indigenous
Bolivians.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2005, Evo Morales was elected President of
Bolivia in a landslide election, in which he received a
historic 54 percent of the national vote. Morales, an
indigenous Aymara from the Bolivian Altiplano and leader
of the coca growers‘ union, had campaigned on a strong antineoliberal discourse, and on the promotion of indigenous
peoples‘ rights.
Morales and his party, Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS),
came to power after a very serious national political crisis, in
which traditional parties and leaders lost credibility, and the
legitimacy of the political regime itself was questioned. In
fact, the previous President elected by popular vote, Gonzalo
Sánchez de Lozada, was forced to resign in October 2003 by
massive popular protests in which indigenous groups played
a central role. His Vice President and successor, Carlos
Mesa, had the same fate less than two years later.
Morales is the first indigenous President in a country where a
substantial proportion of the population is considered to be
indigenous. MAS itself is more a coalition of social
movements, including indigenous organizations, than a
political party in the traditional sense (Zuazo 2008).
Morales‘ statist and redistributive policies are popular with
the poorer sectors of the population, among whom the
indigenous have historically represented a large share
(Jimenez, Landa and Yañez 2006; Molina B. 2005; PNUD
2004). During the last five years, Morales has led a
transformation process which has included, among other
relevant reforms, the re-foundation of Bolivia as a
plurinational state, in which indigenous cultures and social
forms are supposed to have the same value as western social
and political institutions.
In this context, it is very likely that the perceptions of
indigenous people in regards to the country‘s political
2

institutions have improved during the last few years. This
paper attempts to test this general hypothesis, focusing on a
set of variables relevant to the health and stability of a
democratic regime. The variables selected for the analyses
are the following: support for the democratic regime,
support for the political system, voting participation, and
political tolerance. These variables are closely related to
individuals‘ perceptions of rights, equal and fair access, and
social inclusion, which are all crucial components to the
existence of modern democratic societies.
The first two variables, support for democracy and support
for the political system, can be considered as measures of
legitimacy. Support for the democratic regime is the support
that citizens offer to democracy as a form of government.
This is a form of legitimacy of the regime itself, the level of
commitment that citizens have towards democracy as the
―best form of government,‖ in its Churchillean definition.
Support for the political system, on the other hand, refers to
what the specialized literature usually conceptualizes as
―diffuse support‖ (Easton 1975; Seligson 1983); this is the
level of legitimacy of the institutions that form the political
system. While support for democracy is a more abstract
commitment to the regime, support for the political system is
more concrete as it refers to a set of specific institutions.
The third variable refers to a more active dimension of
citizenship: political participation in national elections.
Citizens who vote are a central part of the polity, and their
participation means that they are actually included in the
political system. Despite the fact that voting is compulsory
in Bolivia, enforcement is very weak or non-existent,
particularly in rural areas; so individuals who vote are
actually those who decide to do so. This decision accounts
for at least a minimal level of engagement in national
politics.
3

Finally, the fourth variable chosen for this research, political
tolerance, focuses on the horizontal relationship between
citizens, instead of the relationship between citizens and the
State, as in the previous cases. As a long strand of research
has shown, the existence of politically tolerant citizens is one
of the social conditions for liberal democracies.
Data employed for this project come from the Latin
American Public Opinion Project‘s (LAPOP‘s) database for
Bolivia, which includes biannual surveys conducted since
1998 on probability samples of approximately 3,000 cases
each that represent the national population. 1 Interviews are
conducted in the Spanish, Quechua and Aymara languages.
Because of their temporality and comparability across time,
the data provide the ideal setting for observing changes in
the average perceptions of different subpopulation groups in
Bolivia.
The analyses conducted for this paper seek to identify
statistically significant differences for the indigenous
subpopulation across time in the chosen dependent
variables.2 Different measures to define the indigenous
population are used throughout the paper, but in most cases,
and unless otherwise noted, results are independent of which
grouping variable is used. While most results are presented
using bivariate graphs, all of the results have been tested for
independence from other potentially relevant effects through
multivariate linear and logistic regressions, which are
omitted from the paper for reasons of space.

1

More information on LAPOP and its database can be found at the
project‘s website, www.lapopsurveys.org. Complete descriptions of the
samples employed for each Bolivian study are published within their
respective reports.
2
All analyses conducted in this research take into account the complex
nature of the samples from which the data comes from, using this
information for the appropriate calculation of statistical error (Kish and
Frankel 1974; Knott 1991).
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THE IDENTITY RIDDLE: WHO IS INDIGENOUS IN
BOLIVIA?
The first question that needs to be answered when
indigenous populations are studied is who we are talking
about when we talk about indigenous people. As ethnic
categories are usually contested, the boundaries separating
them tend to be blurry (Abdelal, et al. 2006; Chandra 2006;
Corntassel 2003). In order to identify trends in the
perceptions of a particular group, in this case indigenous
people in Bolivia, a methodological decision regarding the
definition of this population has to be made.
There are different theoretically legitimate approaches to
defining membership within the category referred to as the
indigenous population. At least three of these approaches
are often used by researchers and by government institutions
in Bolivia. One of them is self-identification on a racial
basis; the second is self-identification on a cultural basis; and
the third one is identification of the indigenous population by
the languages they speak, or the language in which they first
learned to communicate during childhood.
The Bolivian government itself, however, despite its
emphasis on the rights of the indigenous population, does not
have an official operative definition of who the indigenous
people are. While the 2009 Constitution defines the
indigenous peoples and nations as the communities that
share culture, institutions, history, and territory, and pre-date
the Spanish conquest (Art. 30), there is no official
methodological definition to operationalize this concept.
This lack of a practical definition has meant that different
state institutions have been employing different
methodological strategies to identify the indigenous

5

population according to their own views and requirements,
and without the existence of a universally applied criterion.3
In terms of the size of the indigenous population in the
country, the three approaches produce strikingly different
results. Using the cultural identification item, almost threefourths of the Bolivian population could be counted as
―indigenous‖ in 2010.
However, using the racial
identification measure, only one-fifth of the national
population would be a part of the group. And if the first
language measure is to be considered, around a quarter of the
population should be counted as indigenous.4
All three methodological alternatives address a particular
dimension of the complex phenomenon of ethnic identities.
Under the racial classification, categories comprising the
non-indigenous population are mestizos, whites, and the
smaller afro-descendent population. Under the cultural
identification classification, non-indigenous are those
individuals who do not feel that they belong to any of the
native groups in Bolivia. When the language variable is
used, the cultural origin of the person, as well as their
membership in a particular linguistic community, is taken
3

For example, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), responsible
for the Census, included in the 2001 Census the cultural identification
item; however, INE has employed language spoken as the main marker
of the indigenous population in their official socio-demographic study
about indigenous people, using the results of the latest Census (INE
2003); other official publications (UDAPE-PNUD 2006) have employed
other methods, such as the Condición Étnico Lingüística (CEL), a
gradual measure of indigenousness that combines cultural identification
with an indigenous group with language spoken and first language
(Molina B. and Albó 2006).
4
These substantially divergent results, which have been noted elsewhere
(Moreno 2008; Moreno, et al. 2008; Seligson, et al. 2006), sparked the
national debate over the ethnic composition of the Bolivian population,
and its consequences for public policies. For part of the debate see (Albó
2004; Albó 2009; Laserna 2004; Lavaud 2007; Lavaud and Lestage
2002; Moreno 2007; Zavaleta 2009).
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into account, and the non-indigenous group is formed by
individuals who do not share that cultural origin.
The LAPOP questionnaires, applied in the surveys
conducted in Bolivia, have employed since 2004 items that
provide information on the three approaches. Research for
this paper has employed alternatively the three options, and
in most cases results are consistent across measures. The
exact formulation of each of the three items, as well as their
results as proportions for 2010, are presented in the
appendix.
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY
It seems evident that a consolidated democracy requires that
citizens think of it as the best form of government;
democracy needs to be ―the only game in town‖ (Linz 1990;
Przeworski 1991) in the minds of all, or at least most,
citizens. And this agreement has to be shared by members of
all relevant political parties and tendencies, as well by
members of different social groups; the agreement of
democracy as the only game in town has to be shared across
all socially relevant cleavages, including ethnic, economic
and political cleavages.
In the case of Bolivia, indigenous people showed
significantly lower levels of agreement with the idea that
―despite its problems, democracy is the best form of
government‖ when compared to non-indigenous people
before the first election of Morales in 2005. But since the
survey conducted in 2006, the average levels of support for
democracy are identical. This trend is evident when all three
variables employed for defining indigenous identity are
considered alternatively.
The following graph presents the evolution of the average
support for democracy for individuals who had an
7

indigenous language as their first language during childhood
compared to respondents who spoke a language other than an
indigenous one as their first language. Differences are
statistically significant in 2004, and the two averages are
indistinct for 2006, 2008 and 2010. It is worth noting that
after a consistent increase between 2004 and 2006 and
between 2006 and 2008, support for democracy has stopped
growing in the 2008-2010 period for both subpopulations.
Graph 1: Temporal evolution of support for democracy for
indigenous and non-indigenous, 2004-2010
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Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

The average satisfaction with democracy has also varied in a
different way for indigenous and non-indigenous individuals
in Bolivia during the last 6 years. Since Evo Morales took
office in 2006, satisfaction has increased significantly – by
more than 10 points in the 0 to 100 scale of the variable – for
indigenous people, while this increase has been much milder
and less constant for non-indigenous people. The following
graph shows this trend across time; groups are defined by
self-identification as indigenous in a racial dimension.
8

Graph 2: Evolution of satisfaction with democracy for
indigenous and non-indigenous, 2004-2010
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These findings show that, since Evo Morales came to power,
the perceptions that indigenous citizens have about
democracy in Bolivia have improved. This improvement has
taken place both in absolute terms and in relative terms –
when perceptions for indigenous individuals are compared to
the average of that for the non-indigenous population. Both
variables treated here show higher averages for the
indigenous population in 2010 than in 2004, as well as an
improvement in the relative position compared to the nonindigenous. In the case of support for democracy, the trend
has been towards evening the average support, while in the
case of satisfaction with democracy, an initial similar
average has turned into a more satisfied indigenous
population.
While that is the general trend, there are relevant differences
between indigenous groups in their satisfaction with
democracy in 2010. Mean satisfaction with democracy is 10
9

points higher in the 0 to 100 scale for people who identify
themselves as Quechua and Aymara versus the average
satisfaction for people who feel apart of other indigenous
groups5; these results are presented in detail in the appendix.
This finding seems to be related with the fact that the MAS
government has been more actively associated with
indigenous organizations from the western highlands of the
country, where Aymara and Quechua are the main groups.
In fact, the relationship of the MAS government with
indigenous people from the lowlands has been increasingly
tense, and that was reflected through several demonstrations
organized by the CIDOB against the Morales government in
2010. 6
SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The variable employed for measuring support for the
political system is an index composed of five items in the
LAPOP questionnaires: the belief that courts guarantee a
free trial; the level of respect for the country‘s political
institutions; the perception of basic rights being protected;
the pride of living under the country‘s political regime; and
the idea that the political system has to be supported. 7 This
index has been employed consistently and satisfactorily by

5

Other indigenous groups refer to the country‘s smaller indigenous
populations that mainly inhabit the Eastern lowlands of the country; these
groups include the Guaraní, Chiquitano, and Mojeño as the most
important categories.
6
CIDOB is the Confederación Indígena del Oriente de Bolivia, the
organization that represents most lowland indigenous people in Bolivia.
7
The questions are originally based on a 1 to 10 scale in which 1 means
that the person does not share the proposed idea at all and 10 that the
person fully agrees with the idea; the index resulting in the combination
of the five items adopts a 0 to 100 scale. The exact formulation of items
in the questionnaire is included in the appendix.
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different studies (see, for example Booth and Seligson 2009;
Seligson 2002.8
In the years previous to the election of Evo Morales,
indigenous people showed lower averages of support for the
political system than non-indigenous individuals. This
difference was statistically significant in 2000 and 2002.
Since 2008, individuals who identify as indigenous show
significantly higher levels of system support than nonindigenous citizens. The following graph illustrates this
trend.
Graph 3: Evolution of mean support for the political system
for indigenous and non-indigenous, 1998-2010
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The grouping variable considered in the previous graph is
identification as indigenous in the racial self-identification
8

The technical construction of the index shows that the items are highly
correlated among them; Cronbach’s alpha for the index using the 2010
Bolivian data is 0.8, which shows good internal consistency.
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question employed in the LAPOP questionnaire; the trend is
similar for the other two alternatives for defining the
indigenous population (cultural identification and first
language). Additionally, and in contrast to what was
observed with satisfaction with democracy, there are no
relevant differences between particular indigenous identities
in 2010 when their average levels of system support are
considered.
It is also relevant that in 2000 the average support for the
political system was lower among indigenous people
independent of other socioeconomic factors, such as income
or level of education, which are correlated with ethnic
identity; conversely, system support is higher among
indigenous in 2010 independent of the same factors. This
suggests that, even considering the significant general
increase in legitimacy of the political system, it is among
indigenous people where this change has been more
dramatic.
VOTING PARTICIPATION
Indigenous people have historically been excluded from the
Bolivian political system. Until the mid-20th century, voting
was restricted to literate individuals who owned some
property, which de facto excluded most of the indigenous
population in the country.
Even until the Ley de
Participación Popular in 1994, participation for most
indigenous people was limited to national elections, as
municipal elections were absent from rural areas where the
majority of the indigenous population lived. Additionally,
voting participation in Bolivia requires not only a valid ID,
which were harder to obtain and mostly useless for other
purposes in rural indigenous communities, but also that
individuals register as voters in a State office, which is
usually absent in rural areas.
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Voter turnout was lower among indigenous people in the
2002 election, according to responses to the 2004 survey;
since the 2005 election, differences between indigenous and
non-indigenous groups in terms of voter turnout seem to
have leveled out, as they are statistically indistinct since
2006. The following graph shows the trends for both groups.
Graph 4: Evolution of voting participation for indigenous and
non-indigenous individuals, 2004-2010
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There is more than one explanation for this increase in the
relative proportion of voters among indigenous people. One
has to do with the aggressive identification policy adopted by
the MAS administration; thousands of individuals who did
not hold a national ID card were registered by mobile
brigades formed for this purpose. This means that the
potential number of voters increased in the country both
among indigenous and non-indigenous citizens; yet, as the
brigades worked mostly in rural and poor urban areas (where
in fact documentation was lower), the rate of documentation
13

for indigenous people was higher than that for nonindigenous individuals.
A second complementary explanation of increased voter
turnout in recent elections is linked to the interest that
citizens show in politics, which has also increased
significantly as a national average between 2008 and 2010.
Interest in politics, higher among those who identify as
Aymara, has increased as a consequence of the relevance of
the most recent elections, in which the continuation of the
transformation process led by Morales was at stake. Interest
in politics was a robust predictor of voter participation in
Bolivia during 2010, showing that an increase in interest
results in an increase in turnout.
POLITICAL TOLERANCE
Political tolerance means the acceptance of people‘s rights to
incur in practices that we do not like. Tolerance is a value
needed for liberal democracies (Prothro and Grigg 1960), in
which citizens can criticize or oppose institutions without
having to fear negative consequences or retaliation from
others.
The measure used for political tolerance is an index
composed of four items that refers to the rights of individuals
who are critical of the country‘s political system; it measures
citizens‘ perceptions of these individuals‘ right to vote, their
right to participate in peaceful demonstrations, their right to
run for office, and their right to give a public speech on TV.9

9

The questions are originally based on a 1 to 10 scale in which 1 means
that the person does not share the proposed idea at all and 10 that the
person fully agrees with the idea; the index resulting in the combination
of the five items adopts a 0 to 100 metric. The exact formulation of items
in the questionnaire is included in the appendix. The tolerance index has
a high internal consistency, with a Cronbach‘s alpha for the 2010
Bolivian data of 0.87.
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Previous studies have shown that the levels of tolerance are,
in general, low for Bolivia when compared to other Latin
American countries (though a positive trend has been
recorded across time) (Moreno, et al. 2010; Moreno and
Seligson 2006). The graph below shows the evolution of the
mean tolerance for individuals who identify themselves as
part of an indigenous group and for the rest of the
population.
Graph 5: Evolution of average political tolerance for
indigenous and non-indigenous subpopulations, 2004-2010
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The average levels of tolerance have increased in the country
during the six-year period between 2004 and 2010. But this
trend does not seem to apply to individuals who identify
themselves as apart of an indigenous group, whose levels of
tolerance have not increased substantially during this
interval. In 2004, indigenous Bolivians showed higher levels
of political tolerance than non-indigenous, and this
difference was statistically significant and robust even when
the effects of socioeconomic factors such as income,
15

education, gender and age were held constant. Six years
later, the average level of tolerance for indigenous is almost
the same as in 2004, while it has increased by more than 10
points within the 0 to 100 tolerance scale among people who
do not identify themselves as apart of an indigenous group.
The multiple regression results for 2004 and 2010 are
included in the appendix of this article.
With slight differences, a similar trend can be observed when
the other two variables that can be employed for defining
indigenous people are considered. Additionally, individuals
who identify themselves as apart of the Aymara people
group show slightly lower levels of tolerance than Quechuas
and other native groups.
As the variable that measures tolerance defines ―those who
oppose the political system‖ as the group to be tolerated, it
could be argued that the high level of support that indigenous
people confer to both the Evo Morales administration and the
political system in general would explain their lower levels
of acceptance of the rights of those who oppose the political
system.
However, a multivariate regression analysis,
included in the appendix, shows that in 2010 individuals who
culturally identify themselves as indigenous are less tolerant
independent of their approval of the Morales administration,
their level of system support, and relevant socioeconomic
characteristics, such as education and income.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence discussed in this paper suggests that the
perceptions and attitudes of indigenous people in Bolivia
have been deeply influenced by the Evo Morales government
and the subsequent state transformation process led by the
MAS. This impact has not been transitory or limited to the
period immediately after the Morales election; many of the
trends that were initially visible in 2006 could still be
observed four years later.
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Indigenous Bolivians now have a better relationship with the
country‘s democratic regime, its political system, and its
most relevant institutions than the one which they had prior
to the MAS government.
While most indicators of
legitimacy have displayed increased average levels for the
country in general, this increase has been sharper among
indigenous people. This means that the improvement is
evident in absolute terms, featuring higher figures amongst
the relevant indicators for the indigenous subpopulation
when compared to the period immediately previous to the
Morales government. It also means that the improvement
can be seen in relative terms, when the mean values for
indigenous people are compared to those for non-indigenous
citizens.
The improvement in the relationship between indigenous
people and the Bolivian State has taken place on different
levels. Support for democracy has increased, as has the
average satisfaction with this form of government. There
have also been relevant changes in support for the political
system, an evaluation that includes perceptions about
fairness; rights being protected; and pride, respect, and
support for political institutions. Indigenous people are now
also more involved in the political system through a better
relative participation in the quintessential democratic
institution of elections. In all areas mentioned, exclusion
along ethnic lines seems to have receded.
Despite these major improvements between indigenous
people and the State, no relevant positive changes have taken
place amongst the attitudes of indigenous people toward
other citizens, particularly toward those who are critical of
the country‘s political system. Independent of different
socioeconomic factors, Bolivia‘s indigenous citizens are now
shown as being less tolerant than non-indigenous. This
difference is recent, and contrasts with pre-MAS data, when
indigenous people appeared to be more tolerant than nonindigenous Bolivians.
17

Finally, the evidence also shows that treating indigenous
people as one general category can be problematic under
certain circumstances. Relevant differences have been found
between distinct indigenous groups, at least in terms of their
levels of satisfaction with the country‘s democracy, and in
terms of their political tolerance. This means that particular
identities can be stronger and more relevant than the general
and commonly employed ―indigenous‖ categories; this
finding is consistent with demands for the recognition of
particular identities by many indigenous organizations, not
only in Bolivia, but in different Latin American countries.
Add to this fact the difficulty mentioned in assessing who the
indigenous populations actually are and one sees the
necessity for scholars and students of indigenous politics in
Bolivia to pay more attention to the processes and dynamics
particular to each distinct ethnic identity, instead of assuming
homogeneity under the broader ―indigenous‖ category.
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APPENDIX
1. Ethnic identification questions
Racial self-identification

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza,
indígena u originaria, negra o Afro-boliviana, mulata u
otra?
( ) Blanca
( ) Mestiza
( ) Indígena/originaria
( ) Negra o Afro-boliviana ( ) Mulata ( ) Otra
( ) NS
( ) NR
Cultural self-identification (question employed in the Bolivian 2001
Census)
BOLETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los
siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? [Leer todas las opciones]

( ) Quechua
( ) Aymara
( ) Guaraní
( ) Chiquitano
( ) Mojeño
( ) Otro nativo
( ) Ninguno
( ) Otros
_____________ (especificar) ( ) NS
( ) NR
Language spoken during childhood question
LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló
de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer
alternativas]
( ) Castellano ( ) Quechua ( ) Aymara ( ) Guaraní ( ) Otro
(nativo) ( ) Otro extranjero ( ) NS ( ) NR
Results for each variable (percentages for 2010)

Cultural ID
Racial ID
First language

Indigenous
72
19
24

Non-Indigenous
28
81
76

2. Dependent variables
Support for democracy
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que
cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en
desacuerdo con esta frase?
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Satisfaction with democracy
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a),
insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia
funciona en Bolivia?
Support for the political system
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia
garantizan un juicio justo?
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de
Bolivia?
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano
están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema
político de Bolivia?
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político
de Bolivia?
Voting participation
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009?
Political tolerance
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de
Bolivia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con
qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas
personas?
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas
puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de
expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de
Bolivia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas
puedan postularse para cargos públicos?
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas
salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?
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3. Results
Mean satisfaction with democracy by ethnic identity, 2010 (0 to 100
scale)
Group

Mean

Quechua
Aymara
Other indigenous
None (No
indigenous)

59.8
61.7
50.9
51.9

Linearized std.
error
0.932
1.049
1.608
1.218

95% Confidence
Interval
58.0
61.7
59.6
63.7
47.7
54.1
49.5
54.3

Predictors of system support, 2000 and 2010 (Linear regression)

Indigenous (racial
self-ID)
Income
Education
Gender (female)
Age
N/R square
* p < .05; **p < .01

2000
Coefficient
-4.89**
0.54
-0.11
-1.61*
-0.06*
2631

t
-3.56
1.71
-1.21
-2.2
-2.12
.009

2010
Coefficient
5.77**
-0.13
0.04
0.82
0.01
2414

t
5.54
-0.59
0.44
1.13
0.37
.014

Predictors of tolerance, 2004 and 2010 (Linear regression)
2004
Coefficient
Indigenous (cultural
self-ID)
Government
approval
System support
Income
Education
Gender (female)
Age
N/R square
* p < .05; **p < .01

t

2010
Coefficient

t

2.20*

2.32

-6.31**

-6.35

-0.08**
0.11**
-0.02
0.13
-1.81*
-0.08**
2605

-3.38
4.94
-0.17
0.34
-2.06
-2.86
.020

-0.13**
0.01
0.04
-0.10
-1.10
-0.10**
2325

-5.55
0.51
0.4
-0.36
-1.24
-3.19
.049
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